

Code based Secret Sharing Schemes for MANET

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Abstract

Secret values sharing in MANET is computationally insecure and inconsistent because of its dynamic nature. Shamir's proposal is well known prominent secret sharing schemes. But it does not provide a dynamic approach to the particular application. In the same distribution process nodes may join or leave the network and able to obtain the similar capabilities as initial nodes; further, the joined nodes gain the shares (updated shares) corresponding to the secret. Two additional features of proposed system are that it allows to implement threshold operations, one for distributing secret information with other nodes and the other is using our threshold schemes in key management. Secret values sharing in MANET is computationally insecure and inconsistent because of its dynamic nature. Proposed the group key establishment protocol operations in detail and also proposed two different methods for dealing network dynamic nature including adding and removing of the nodes..

Keywords: Interpolation, Key Generation, Key Management, MANETs, Threshold, Secret Sharing

1. Introduction

Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks¹ have ideal applications in different areas like military and civilian^{2,3} such as surveillance in the battlefield. Different applications and areas of the WSN (wireless sensor networks) needs secure communications. However, Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks⁴ are prone to dissimilar types of malicious attacks, such as masquerading, impersonating, interception for misleading because of the connectivity of wireless, the non availability of the physical protection and the unattended deployment. Thus, it is most important to implement security in sensor network is most important.

MANETs consist of dynamic nodes interconnected with wireless multi-hop communication paths⁴. In this network system, to communicate with each other the participating nodes do not need access points to reach another, by using a variety of routing protocols^{5,6} the one participating node reaches another. Generally, in an ad hoc network routes among nodes may include multiple hops, thus it is suitable to call such networks as multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks. Within its transmission range, every node will be capable to interact directly

with another node. The main security requirement^{1,4} for MANETs is confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability and non-repudiation.

Because mobile ad hoc networks have additional vulnerabilities than the traditional wired networks, thus security is not easy in the mobile ad hoc network.

Shamir⁷ had suggested a scheme for splitting a sequence of data D into n different parts so that D can be rebuilt simply with k parts using Lagrange's Interpolation method. This method enables the creation of strong key management designed for cryptographic system. A secret sharing scheme for an access structure is a technique in which a node is called dealer distributes secret shares to different participants such that (i) any subset shares can rebuild the secret, and (ii) any subset shares not in cannot acquire any information particularly about the secret in the theoretic sense of information. A secret sharing scheme⁸ is ultimate if the secret selected from the same domain shareholders shares.

The key being secret brings many issues because of its constraint. Secret key storing with server or a person or database reduces the system security to the credibility and security of that manager. Moreover, not having a proper

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backup of the key leads the problem of losing the key if a misbehaviour takes place. On the other hand, if more than one manager holds the key, an enemy with a desire for the key has more flexibility of choosing the goal. To resolve these problems of key management, secret sharing schemes are introduced⁸⁻¹⁰.

These schemes using an idea to share a secret with a set of managers such that only the coalitions of predefined can come together and disclose the secret, although no other coalition can get any information regarding the secret. Thus, the keys used in areas require extremely important secrecy like control mechanisms of nuclear systems, large-scale finance applications and command, can be stored by using secret sharing schemes¹⁰. Here, the secret is shared in the network to identify suspected nodes. By replacing private key for their equivalent public key encrypted¹¹ data, we can easily rebuild the original secret key.

2. Detection of Fake Shareholders (Cheaters)

A verifiable secret-sharing scheme¹² provides its shareholders with a capacity to validate that (i) every time the secret shares get from the dealer are copied from the same secret and (ii) the shares of secret get from the other share holder in the secret rebuild process are authentic shares. These characteristics are extremely important. For an example, some shareholders can fake by a corrupt dealer by assigning them fake shares. Noise or Communication errors can also consequence of fake shares. Also shareholder may cheat²⁵ others in the secret rebuilding procedure to prevent others from getting the original secret by presenting fake shares.

Sharing of the secret concept was first introduced by Blakley et al.^{13,14} and Shamir⁷. Shamir⁷ proposed scheme based on the standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation method, whereas the scheme by Blakley et al.^{13,14} is based on the method of geometric that uses the concept of intersect hyper planes. Sarkar et al.¹⁵ proposed Chinese Remainder Theorem, which is depends on RSA Threshold cryptography¹⁶ in MANET using the scheme of Verifiable secret sharing. It develops Threshold cryptographic based schemes for mobile ad-hoc network. In the area of deterministic key pre-distribution, for a long time it uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Ravi et al.¹⁷ anticipated attack resistant and capable key agreement scheme in

MANET for secure group communication. For a group key generation this method also used CRT. The group key generation mechanism suffers from updating overhead because of the MANET dynamic nature.

Amuthan et al.¹⁸ developed Sharing of secret for secure routing scheme in MANETs. This protocol implements a sharing of secret scheme using Shamir's secret sharing scheme⁷ approach. Papadimitoras and Hass¹⁹ designed Secure Data Transmission in MANET, which is depends on multiple paths. The main focus of the scheme is on robustness and privacy in communication. For privacy, to strengthen the data confidentiality a coding scheme using the XOR operation was recognized.

In our work we address the secret distribution to attain the distribution and privacy aspects of key management²⁰. There exist a lot of scope for research in MANETs on security²¹. However, all security protocols are having some primary aspects that are very common. As the responsibility of a single node one can avoid those vital system events. Each node will be authenticated, authorized and non-repudiated. The Data sequence should be very confidential, so it cannot be changed easily²². Solutions provided by Threshold cryptography are essential help for aspect of security in MANET. In the literature, there are no computationally secured threshold cryptography considering such aspects. In this proposed scheme, we implement a method which would also be capable in point of the security aspects mentioned and it also would be more secured.

3. Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme²³

In this topic, we give details about verifiable secret sharing scheme which was addressed by Sivakumar et al.²³ is denoted as the initial set of n nodes in MANETs. In this protocol, centralized node is treated as a dealer. Which all other nodes connected to it act as participants. In this multi-secret sharing scheme, multiple of secrets having by the dealer which like to distribute with a certain number of nodes (participants) in the MANETs securely. In a sharing of secret scheme, a secret can be divided into shares, these schemes transmit information about the secret and need to be store securely. For secret reconstruction and verification, secret sharing also may use some public values associated with each player. Let set of n nodes involved in the sharing of secret. These

n participants denoted as p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n and let a positive integer t such that $1 \leq t \leq n$. We fix a prime $q > n$, and n distinct points $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{t-1} \in F_q$. Let (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k) are the k pieces of secrets to be distributed to the participants of n .

In MANETs, server act as a dealer who runs initialization and distribution algorithms and let s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k represents k pieces of secrets to be distributed to participants of n . Previous to distribution phase, dealer uses the advantages of hash function and Identity based signature scheme. Each participant allocated with unique identity $ID_i, i=1, 2, \dots, n$. In this, a *Setup* polynomial time algorithm runs by a dealer that takes a security parameter 1^λ as inputs and outputs public parameters *params* and a master secret key *MSK* is as follows: $Setup(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (MSK, params)$.

Now the dealer runs polynomial time algorithm in which identity ID_i , public *params* and master secret key *MSK* takes as input and output a secret key SK_{ID_i} associated to the identity ID_i is as follows:

$$KeyGen(ID_i, MSK, params) \rightarrow SK_{ID_i}.$$

Previous to the secret sharing, dealer sends secret key SK_{ID_i} as secret shadows to the participants p_i securely. Then dealer randomly selects a value r and calculate $f(r, SK_{ID_i})$ for the values of $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$.

The dealer shows how to execute the sharing of secret algorithm in two separate cases: when $k \leq n$ and $k > n$. If pooling happens with atleast t or greater than t participants, then their secret shares will make it simple to rebuild the secrets, but secret share rebuild is not done by $t - 1$ or lesser secret shares. In the information-theoretic sense, this scheme is an ideal threshold scheme in which significant only $t-1$ or lesser secret shares gives no additional message about the secrets to an enemy.

Sivakumar et.al.²⁴ proposed three different secret sharing schemes for compartmental access structures.

3.1 Proposed Code-based Threshold Scheme

Given any set of k shares can determined the secret s where $s = (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k)$. And given any set of $k-1$ and lesser shares gives nothing about the secret s . Let there are P_i participants where $1 \leq i \leq n$. Let S is secret space and T be the share space be the vector spaces over field F . Assume that $f : S \rightarrow T$ be the one to one share function to calculate shares for n participants. Let $s = (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k)$ be the vector space consisting of k secrets and $T = (t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n)$

$= f(s)$ the share given only to i^{th} participant is t_i .

3.1.1 Initialization Phase

- Choose a random prime number F as field.
- Choose maximum number of participants n and threshold value $k \in F$.
- Choose arbitrarily $s_i \in F, 1 \leq i \leq k$ such that s_i is the i^{th} element in the secret space s .

3.1.2 Distribution Phase

- Let the vector $e_i \in F^k$ with the i^{th} entry being identity element 1 and other entries being the 0 element of F such that every $s \in F^k$ vector can be expressed as

$$s = \sum_{i=1}^k s_i e_i$$

- Compute the shares of participants by using the following share function:

$$f(s) = f\left(\sum_{i=1}^k s_i e_i\right) = \sum_{i=1}^k s_i f(e_i) = sG = (t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n),$$

where, G is $k \times n$ generator matrix, the rank of G is k . and $(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n) = T$ is the share vector.

- Distribute the shares to the n participants such that i^{th} participant gets the t_i^{th} share for $1 \leq i \leq n$.
- Publish the generator matrix.
- Choose any k (threshold value) columns of generator matrix to form a sub matrix $G(i_1, i_2, \dots, i_u)$ where i_1, i_2, \dots, i_u are the $i_1^{th}, i_2^{th}, \dots, i_u^{th}$ columns of given generator matrix and $1 \leq u \leq n$.
- Obtain the shares $t_{i_1}, t_{i_2}, \dots, t_{i_u}$.
- Recover the secret vector s by solving the following linear equation:

$$sG(i_1, i_2, \dots, i_u) = (t_{i_1}, t_{i_2}, \dots, t_{i_u}).$$

4. Proposed Hierarchical Dynamic Threshold Scheme

4.1 Initialization

Dealer uses a Shamir scheme to distribute shares of an initial secret α_1 with threshold t_0 among players $P = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n\}$ and then he leaves the scheme. Suppose there are m levels $\{L_1, L_2, \dots, L_m\}$ with set of players $\{n_1, n_2, \dots, n_m\}$ and thresholds $\{t_1, t_2, \dots, t_m\}$ corresponds to field F_q .

4.2 Sharing Phase

For each $i \in [1, m-1]$ repeat the following steps:

- The Players in the set P use polynomial production protocol, to generate a random secret β_i shares with threshold $t \in \min[t_i, t_{i+1}, \dots, t_m]$.
- Players n_i keeps shares of β_i shares as their final shares.
- Now $P = P - \{n_i\}$.

For level L_m :

Players in set P will calculate the following constant.

For $i \in [1, m-1]$, $\alpha_{i+1} = \alpha_i + \beta_i$.

After calculating $\{\alpha_2, \alpha_3, \dots, \alpha_m\}$ they remain only shares of α_m as their final shares. Dynamically varying the Threshold at each level: Apply Lagrange Method for Threshold Modification Technique at each level from t_i to t'_i , where $i \in [1, m-1]$.

4.3 Recovery of the Secrets at Each Level

For $i \in [1, m-1]$. Now, if a set Δ'_i of at least t'_i participants cooperates, by using the method of Lagrange interpolation they can recover the secret:

$$Secret_i = \sum_{j \in \Delta'_i} (\gamma_j^{\Delta'_i} \times \varphi_j)$$

Which was named as α_i . Now we got level wise secrets i.e. α_m from level m, β_{m-1} from level (m-1), β_{m-2} from level (m-2),..... β_1 from level 1.

Then by solving the following system of linear congruence:

$$\alpha_{i+1} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \pmod{q} \quad \text{for } i = (m-1)$$

down from level $i=1$.

Therefore, $\alpha_{m-1}, \dots, \alpha_1$ are recovered.

4.4 Polynomial Construction

- Initially, randomly select t players from P.
- Using Shamir scheme every t players P_i distributes a secret, called δ_i , $i \in [1, t]$ between the entire players, where t-1 is the degree of the polynomial secret sharing.
- Each player includes its shares of the δ_i s as one. As a outcome, every player has a their own share on t-1 degree polynomial $g(x)$ with a constant term $\delta = \sum \delta_i$.

5. Threshold Change Algorithm by Lagrange Method

A set is fixed such that the set comprises of at least t designated players identifiers. Every player $P_i \in \Delta$ chooses random polynomial $g_i(x)$ of degree at most t-1 such that $g_i(0) = f(i)$. He then gives $g_i(j)$ to P_j for $1 \leq j \leq n$, i.e., re-sharing the original shares with supplementary shares.

The global constants are calculated as follows:

$$\gamma_j^\Delta = \prod_{j \in \Delta, j \neq i} \frac{j}{j-1} \quad \text{for all } i \in \Delta.$$

Every player $P_j (1 \leq j \leq n)$ replace its old shares, and then adds the supplementary shares which was received from other players to calculate its new share as given here:

$$\varphi_j = \sum_{i \in \Delta} (\gamma_j^\Delta \times g_i(j)).$$

6. Suggested Scheme Analysis

In the proposed scheme, generally, every share and participating node were verified by the verification scheme that participating nodes shares are consistent. Inconsistent shares cannot generate by the dealer in the sharing phase. If at least one of the verification equations does not satisfy then an inconsistent share generated by the dealer. In the reconstruction phase also verification scheme which is validated by the member of coalition S that all the participating nodes also cannot repudiate. If some node is repudiated, then there will be at least one not satisfied verification equation exists. In such a case, the false node is treated as malicious nodes. This is a cooperative approach where the i^{th} nodes share would be verified by the other alliance member. Hence, there is no scope of duplicitous by any malicious nodes. The participating nodes would get the secret value if all the shares are valid. The shared secret values always satisfy the validity, because in the coalition no adversary is able to participate easily. The node is identified as adversary when it is not satisfying the verification equation.

7. Discussion

We proposed a key management scheme in this paper

which make use of secret sharing schemes based on code based secret sharing schemes and dynamical secret sharing schemes based on polynomial interpolation proposed by Shamir's. The inner components of key management scheme are made by these secret sharing schemes. This key management is based on the SSS (Secret Sharing Scheme), in which the system secret is distributed to a group of server nodes. The server group creates a view of a CA (*Certification Authority*). The advantage of key management is that it is easier for a node to request service from a well maintained group to a certain extent than from multiple independent service providers which may be spread in a large area. It is easier for servers to manage within the group rather than with the entire network throughout the secret share updating phase. Future, we integrate our proposed scheme to the key management approach.

8. References

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